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Despite the many contrasting opinions on the trajectory of US power and 
the forthcoming structure of the international system, a conventional wisdom seems 
to have emerged in the literature, which suggests that the era of US unipolarity is 
fading and China is ready to step up as a superpower able to equal – or even substitute 
– US primacy in terms of material capabilities. Michael Beckley’s work counters this 
widespread interpretation and tackles the empirical observations on which it rests. It 
does so by pursuing an accurate criticism of the gross indicators (like GDP or military 
spending) conventionally employed to measure state power, and by proposing an al-
ternative methodology to evaluate states’ capabilities in net terms.  
Without considering the costs that countries face for protecting their terri-
tories and populations, he argues, gross indicators tend to overstate the capabilities 
of large and populous countries. Accordingly, Beckley proposes (Chapter 2) to deduct 
three types of costs (production, welfare and security costs) to the gross indicators of 
states’ economic and military resources. From this operation, it derives a net meas-
urement of one country’s power that – Beckley maintains – is more accurate and 




revealing than classic indices. To prove this point, he offers a recalculation of the 
capabilities of the great powers involved in prolonged, militarized rivalries over the 
last two centuries and shows that – when their resources are measured in net terms – 
the power asymmetry between them is an effective means to predict their failure or 
success. The best examples are the major conflicts involving China and Russia in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries such as the two Opium Wars between China and 
Britain or the Russian-German rivalry culminated in WWI, to name but a few. In 
terms of gross indicators, China and Russia represented the strongest side in all the 
conflicts considered; nevertheless, they have always been defeated. By counting state 
capabilities differently, in fact, however, those countries’ net power position com-
pared to their rivals (either Britain, Japan, or the US) was considerably weaker; it is 
exactly this gap in net resources – Beckley argues – that explains their defeats.  
Moving on to the emerging rivalry between China and the United States, 
Beckley acknowledges that the Asian giant is its most likely challenger. However, his 
detailed evaluation of Beijing’s economic and military resources leaves no room for 
doubts: China lags behind the US on almost every net indicator, and the gap between 
the two is unlikely to vanish any time soon. This conclusion is surprising if one con-
siders the constant references – in academia and the media – to China’s rise and the 
Asian century. Beckley points out the weaknesses of the Chinese economy (Chapter 
3), the hidden costs for a large, populous and developing country that are not included 
in gross estimates, and the various advantages that the US economic system still owns 
despite the limited growth of the post-2008 period.  
Similarly, he compares (Chapter 4) the net military capabilities of the two 
powers by subtracting, for example, the costs to maintain security at home from their 
overall military assets. Also, he addresses the geopolitical factors that separate the US 
and Chinese ability to project their military power abroad. From this analysis, it 




emerges that China’s position is severely constrained by the high costs paid to assure 
its internal security and the defense of its national borders as well as by the welfare 
costs associated to the large number of troops composing the People’s Liberation 
Army. Beckley argues that China’s rising military capabilities are also constrained by 
the continued presence of US outposts in the region and the improvements made by 
China’s neighbors to their own military forces. Overall, this assessment leaves few 
chances for Beijing to obtain the regional hegemony that it would need to challenge 
the US on a global scale.  
Beckley’s analysis also indicates the path forward (Chapter 5), starting from 
the rejection of the theories usually employed to predict the fate of US power (bal-
ance-of-power theory and “convergence” theory).  All indicators suggest that the US 
will retain its role of leading global power in the coming years, notwithstanding 
China’s uninterrupted rise. Beckley is eager to point out, however, that this conclu-
sion should not be confused with the praise of American superiority or invincibility. 
At no point, does his analysis suggest that Washington’s primacy is uncontestable or 
destined to last forever. Instability with weaker countries, unnecessary wars, internal 
polarization and disunity, can all produce unpredicted losses and undermine the po-
sition of the most powerful country in the world (Chapter 6). Beckley’s argument, 
therefore, consists in a re-evaluation of the sources of power that have guaranteed 
the US primacy since the end of the Cold War. Those same sources still place the 
United States in a category of its own, apart from the other great powers of the sys-
tem. This book’s claim, in the end, is about the duration of the unipolar era, which it 
predicts will last more than usually expected, not about the infallibility or moral vir-
tues of US power.  
A few years later on the publication of this book, its central tenets are even 
more relevant. Events such as Trump’s nationalist policies, the trade war with China, 




the COVID-19 outbreak seem to have accelerated history and the shift away from 
the post-Cold War unipolar configuration. Beckley’s work, however, invites to reject 
simplistic predictions about the dismissal of US primacy. The decline in Washington’s 
global influence as well as the retrenchment from its international responsibilities do 
not necessarily mean that its net position in terms of material capabilities has col-
lapsed or that a condition of power parity with China has finally emerged. Even if 
outcomes are not favorable to US interests, it does not mean that US power has 
vanished. This is a relevant reminder for policymakers in both Washington and Bei-
jing.  
At the same time, Beckley’s contribution warns us not to take the perpetu-
ation of unipolarity for granted. Over the long period, erratic strategies and idiosyn-
cratic choices risk damaging irreversibly US capabilities and its role as a global leader. 
Washington, in other words, will likely remain the most powerful actor in the system, 
but it has few guarantees other than sharp and efficient policies to keep this condition 
in place.  
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